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In 200 1 there were over 41 million Americans who were not covered by any form 
of health insurance. This was 14.6% of the population at that time. There were 5 states 
that had only 8% of the population uninsured, and Texas, one ofthe largest states by 
population, had the highest number of uninsured at 24%, almost a quarter of its 
population. (Kaiser Family Foundation) These numbers have been increasing every year 
since then, and one of the main causes of such phenomenon is that the cost of health 
insurance has been growing at an alarming rate. While there is a political constituency in 
support of the idea that healthcare should remain de-linked from collective responsibility 
and thus from the government's duties, it is my personal inclination that everyone should 
have some kind of health insurance, and thus also that any individual should be able to 
access medical care without having to pay more than he or she can afford. This thesis is 
informed by such socio-political and ethical perspectives. 
Looking at the legislature's aggressive attempts to change the sad situation that 
characterizes the American health insurance, it is obvious that change is something 
people want -including those who believe that healthcare is a private, not public, matter. 
The fundamental question boils down to what the best way to fix the problem might be. 
In this project I proceed with an investigation of two alternative ways to fulfill the intent 
of rationalizing healthcare in the United States: 1) with the government as one ofthe 
health care providers; 2) without the government as one of the healthcare providers, that 
is, with a government that maintains the sole role of setting rules and subsidizing the 
healthcare needs of the poorest segments of the population. 
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The difficulty of identifying ways and extent to which the government should 
intervene to eliminate the "uninsured" from the American landscape is the main reason 
that has prevented changes from already occurring. Part of the population seems to think 
that a government's direct participation in health care provision would not only offer 
people another option (the so called public option) in their choice of what health 
insurance plan to use, but would also increase the depth of market competition, thus 
contributing to the rationalization of the costs of private health insurance plans --as the 
insurance companies would need to be competitive vis-a-vis the government's option to 
stay in the market-. Others however fear that the government may be unfairly 
competitive in comparison to private health insurance companies, thus becoming a de 
facto monopolist; and that a government-run health plan would end up looking like one 
of the country's inefficient public agencies. Those who believe that change in the health 
insurance market of the United States is long overdue, and yet think that the public option 
would not be an appropriate course of action, tend to lean more towards the second 
alternative, in which the government is solely a rule-maker and a subsidizer. 
This is not the first time that the United States has considered health care reform: 
at the beginning of another democratic president's term, the Clinton administration made 
a strong move to try to reform the healthcare insurance market. Clinton and his 
administration crafted the legislation and brought it to Congress, as opposed to President 
Obama's method of encouraging the Houses of Congress to design the legislation 
themselves. The Clinton administration's attempt at healthcare reform was grandiose to 
say the least, as it attempted to overhaul the entire industry from top to bottom. 
Ultimately, "Clintoncare" or "Hillarycare," as the proposed legislation came to be known, 
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was a huge failure that produced no change in the healthcare system. The main reasons 
the Clintons' attempt failed all related to the fact that they proposed radical change in the 
way the health insurance functioned, encountering opposition from all sides: insurance 
companies, pharmaceutical companies, and the population itself. Too dramatic of a 
change, people thought. The hope now, for those so inclined, is that President Obama's 
plan to reform the health care system will not scare the business world and the population 
in the same ways. 
As mentioned above, the point of departure of this thesis is the assumption that a 
healthcare reform is necessary, and that accessibility of medical care by the entire 
population of the United States, one of the wealthiest countries in the world, is a right that 
people have acquired. Approaching the question of which alternative embeds the highest 
promise in effectively tackling the healthcare problem ceases to be a mostly ethical, 
moral, and political enterprise, and becomes a relevant economic question, that can be 
analyzed according to multiple lenses. In order to perform any meaningful analysis on 
alternatives that, at their core, are distinguished by the entry or non-entry of the 
government in the healthcare market, one needs to become familiar not only with the 
effects on competition that the entry of the government in a market might cause, but also 
with the specifics of each alternative model, that are contained in the currently proposed 
healthcare reform legislation. The first two chapters of the thesis address these 
preliminary and essential aspects, and in some fundamental way take the role of the 
literature review that typically introduces the more analytical portion of an essay. 
The first chapter of the thesis lays a basic economic framework for the work that 
is done in subsequent chapters of the thesis. When looking for answers to policy 
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questions it is always essential to first acquire an understanding of the theoretical 
background on the basis of which the questions are asked. In this case, as an economist, 
it is important that before proposing any policy option the economic rationale beneath our 
questioning is clarified. This chapter is an attempt to show some of the structural issues 
that are present in the health care market, including the high price of health insurance. 
And finally there is discussion of the nature of the service itselfthat may create a need for 
the government to get involved. 
The second chapter surveys the healthcare insurance systems of Germany and 
Great Britain, two countries in many ways comparable to the United States, in which both 
provision and administration ofhealthcare include a significant involvement of the 
government. Germany and Great Britain are just two of the many other industrialized 
countries in which healthcare and health insurance markets are substantially different 
than those of the United States. The second chapter provides a brief breakdown ofthese 
countries' healthcare systems to see whether there is any objective reason for which other 
countries are able to have sustainable public healthcare systems that are perceived 
unfeasible in the United States. Is it a matter of efficiency? What is different in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency of delivery of healthcare when the government is the main 
provider versus when there is minimal interference of the government in the healthcare 
market? Perhaps the system adopted in other industrialized countries can act as 
inspiration for the evolution of the United States healthcare system. The two case studies 
developed in the second chapter may allow for a less alarming approach to the possibility 
that the government of the United States might administer healthcare insurance for its 
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entire population, without, because of that, being charged of murder of the whole 
capitalistic system. 
The third chapter of this essay moves the lens towards the United States, and 
attempts a schematization of the current legislative proposals on health care reform. As 
mentioned earlier, the legislation proposed to reform the American healthcare system has 
taken different and very specific forms, and a survey of the various proposed paradigms 
is necessary in order to gain an understanding of what's to be evaluated. Thus the third 
chapter of the thesis reviews as factually as possible the healthcare legislation under 
current debate on Capitol Hill. Because journalistic news are often subject to some degree 
of political bias and are typically embedded in commentaries, chapter three refers directly 
to the main actual legislative proposals, outlining the fundamental differences among 
them. The goal of such survey is not only to accurately present the possibilities of 
healthcare reform under scrutiny in the United States' Congress and Senate, but also to 
gather sufficient ground to formulate meaningful questions that will frame the analysis 
developed in the fourth chapter. 
The fourth chapter of this thesis offers a mostly empirical analysis of the 
government's increased participation in the health care market, accompanied by an 
extensive literature review. The first and most relevant question· raised in the fourth 
chapter in relation to the importance of the government's direct intervention in the 
healthcare market, looks at whether the existence of a public option in the insurance 
market may improve the quality of health (life expectancy, mortality, etc.) in the country. 
The econometric model utilized to approach this question is the well-known ordinary 
least squares (OLS), through which a set of variables that should reasonably have an 
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effect on the health outcomes of a country is discussed and implemented. The goal of this 
econometric analysis is to evaluate the likelihood that the quality of health in a country 
improves as government involvement in the health care market increases. 
A final concluding chapter rewinds back to the fundamental question raised in this 
essay, that is, whether the current healthcare reform proposal in the United States should 
add a public plan to the health insurance system. In some ways, this thesis responds to a 
sense of civic duty --the duty of asking the question- that should arise in each citizen of a 
country. The United States health insurance landscape is clearly below par, is likely to 
significantly change in the near future, and this essay -together with all Americans-- tries 
to figure out the best course of action to improve the health of our nation. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION THE 
HEALTH CARE MARKET 
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate an approach to the opportunity for 
government intervention in the health care market specifically from an economic point of 
view. In economics, there are specific rationales that support the choice between 
government intervention and government regulation. Laissez-faire economics assumes 
that markets --and therefore the firms that operate within them- function efficiently and 
thus with the flexibility required to reach equilibrium. Whenever a market does not 
operate efficiently, does not take into consideration all costs and benefits, or does not 
contain the necessary flexibility to achieve equilibrium, we say that there must be a level 
of market failure. This chapter lay a basic framework of some economic terms and ideas 
that show that the healthcare market is not operating at an efficient or equilibrium level, 
and thus that there is appropriate economic reason to approach the question of whether 
the government should step in. The chapter proposes an analysis of the market through 
the lenses of market structure, cost analysis, and the nature of the good itself. 
When considering the structure of the market in health care it is important to 
recognize the structure of the health insurance delivery system. At the current time and 
after the new health care reform bill takes full effect, health insurance companies offer 
different insurance policies in different states; some states have different health insurance 
companies than other states. What this creates is a situation that substantially limits the 
degree of competition in the market, leading to an oligopolistic market structure. An 
oligopoly is a market in which there are only a few competitors that provide services to a 
large group of consumers. Because of the limited degree of competition among firms 
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(insurance companies), this market structure creates a situation in which each firm's 
profit is maximized by providing less service at a higher price -than in more competitive 
market forms--. Oligopoly protects firms from the risk (a certainty in long-run perfect 
competition) of been out-competed by other firms whenever the price is higher than the 
average cost. In this situation we would see that even in the short-run the supply curve 
for the oligopoly is much steeper than the supply curve that would prevail in perfect 
competition, crossing the demand curve at a higher equilibrium price and lower 
equilibrium quantity then the supply curve of the perfectly competitive firm. This can be 
seen in the graph below: 
S: Oligopoly 
p 
S: Perfect Competttion 
P* 
a* a* a 
Thus, the market operates inefficiently due to the fact that the oligopoly is 
undersupplying health care to the consumers and that the price is higher than it would be 
in perfect competition. The cost this represent to the consumer --and thus society--, 
which is directly related to the degree of market power these companies have, can be 
shown by the size of the Deadweight Loss (DWL). This is done by looking at the 
difference between the perfectly competitive and oligopoly equilibrium levels of price 
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and quantity. This can be seen in the graph below where the shaded region is the total 
amount of DWL that arise when a perfectly competitive market becomes an oligopoly: 
S: Perfect CompetKion 
Q* U* a 
While the total value (a dollar amount) of this area will not be quantified here, what the 
DWL shows is the inefficiency (cost) to society produced by the specific market structure 
health insurance companies are characterized by: it thus provides a measurement of 
market failure: some of the benefits society could obtain from a more competitive health 
insurance market are lost. 
While this could be in itself a sufficient reason for government intervention, that 
is, for a reform of the health care system by adding a public insurance option and increase 
the level of competition in that way, the current reform does not contain remedies to the 
limited number of firms that operate in each state market. The government has instead 
stipulated ways to bring the affordability of health insurance under control by using 
subsidies, and by making the existing markets function more efficiently both 
institutionally and by looking at costs. Why are healthcare costs so high? One of the most 
important reasons beneath the fact that healthcare has become so expensive over the last 
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few decades has been the increase in quality-improving technology in the health care 
delivery system (Gruber, p. 467). There has been in fact a vast improvement in the quality 
of medical procedures and increased accuracy in the tests that are being done for 
diagnostic purposes. Most if not all would admit that this is a good thing overall, but 
these new tests and procedures definitely cost more than the now obsolete ones. And 
while more recently the cost of these newer procedures and test has decreased, the total 
amount of healthcare spending has increased. How could this be? The answer is that 
these tests have been used much more frequently than before: thus even if the cost (and 
price) decreased, the quantity has increased, producing an overall increase in spending. 
While it seems obvious that this increase in spending needs to be studied more deeply, it 
is hard to imagine that a containment of spending could be achieved by decreasing the 
use of the best available medical procedures. Along the same lines, administrative costs 
are also good candidates for downward revision, and there is reason to believe that such a 
revision could be promoted by government participation in the healthcare market. 
Because the higher administrative structure for healthcare is already in place in the 
government -through the Department of Health and Human Services--, the typically very 
high costs of top management in very large private companies would be spared, thus 
giving a government-run option a competitive edge that would push private companies to 
reduce their own administrative costs. 
The possible ability of a government-run health program to introduce relatively 
cost-effective practices in the market may be a good story to link government 
intervention to more affordable healthcare insurance, but none of the arguments presented 
provides an economic justification for high prices. There is actually reason to believe that 
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prices should not be much lower than they are. This has to do with the particular nature of 
the service in question: health insurance, and thus health care, is a service that does not 
limit its benefits to the private individual: there is good reason to believe that there is a 
moderate amount of social benefit arising from health insurance and so healthcare. One 
can look at this situation as one that is affected by positive externalities, that is, social 
effects that are not included or represented in the equilibrium price. In this case, the 
externality is the benefit that others receive from the fact that an individual receives 
healthcare: such benefit that goes beyond the specific healing effect the person receives is 
called social benefit. Examples of these "external" effects ofhealthcare abound. Suppose 
that someone at your school has a cold, and does not have health insurance: she/he will 
likely not receive treatment or medicine to fix the health problem. Thus, you now are 
much more likely to catch that cold and miss days of school because she/he did not have 
access to proper care. This is clearly an easy example of the social benefit of health care. 
Using the same example while imagining it at a work place, the employer would benefit 
greatly from the fact that her/his employees have health insurance: by receiving proper 
treatment they will miss fewer days of work and the firm can be more productive. There 
is also an immediate monetary social benefit in health insurance: when an individual is 
without health insurance and yet in need for care, her/his only option is to go to the 
emergency room and receive urgent care, which does not require payment to people with 
no means. While there is no direct cost to any other individual, think of what does 
happen next. Someone must pay for the emergency room's supplies and the doctor's 
time: the hospital pays the doctor and buys more supplies. Then the hospital must charge 
the insurance company for the cost of those items. And how does the insurance company 
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make up for the extra costs? Clearly by increase the insurance premiums of those who do 
have health insurance. Increasing the number of insured people clearly has a number of 
both private and social benefits. 
These external effects of wider health insurance can be seen through economic 
modeling., in the graph below: 
0 including social benefit 
0 Perfect competftion ~rivate benefit only) 
U* Q* u 
We now clearly have a dilemma. On one side we have already identified the need to 
substantially decrease the excessively high costs of health insurance. On the other, by 
including the positive externality produced by health insurance we end up with an 
equilibrium price higher than that of a perfectly competitive market (because it now 
represents not only private but also social benefits). How should this situation be 
approached? The appropriate policy in an economic sense is that something needs to be 
done to decrease the monopoly power of firms (insurance companies) and drive the 
oligopolistic equilibrium into a competitive one (another competitor perhaps?). This, 
together with regulation that reduces discriminatory practices in granting health 
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insurance, would increase the total number of insured and would maximize social benefit. 
And then there must be some sort of subsidization of the excess price that would be 
charged to reach this higher number of insured. It seems obvious that in this situation 
there needs to be some sort of intervention by the government. There is a level of market 
failure and there is a social benefit that is not being taken into account by the competitive 
equilibrium. We can't at this point conclude that therefore a public option is needed; 
perhaps astute regulation could achieve the same results. But what we can certainly 
conclude is that there is a strong economic rationale to proceed with this analysis, and 
study the possible scenarios that may materialize in the United States once the healthcare 
reform takes place. 
15 
CHAPTER2 
PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN GERMANY AND GREAT 
BRITAIN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
The health care models in countries culturally and economically comparable to the 
United States are substantially different from the American one. Why is it that in every 
other industrialized country the government directly provides health insurance and health 
care to its population while the United States continues to almost exclusively maintain a 
private system of provision of health services? This chapter looks in some detail at the 
healthcare systems of two other industrialized countries to shed light on their differences, 
benefits, and possible shortcomings: the German public healthcare system is possibly the 
oldest in the world; and the British National Health Service (NBS) is often considered the 
closest vis-a-vis the United States' one. 
2.1 First Case Study: Germany 
Germany implemented its current national health care system in 1883, and has had 
mandatory health insurance since that time. The German health care system is organized 
as a blend of decision-making and administrative responsibilities held by both federal and 
regional public agencies. At the federal level, the Ministry for Health and the parliament 
control five specific areas of the national healthcare system: administration and 
international relations; pharmaceuticals/medical products and long-term care; health care 
and statutory health insurance; protection of health, prevention and containment of 
disease; consumer protection and veterinary care. (European Observatory, 22) 
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The regional level guarantees effectiveness and functionality of the overall 
national system. Thus, states (Lander) are required to secure health insurance to every 
citizen and to ensure the implementation of the following general principles: all hospitals 
treat all citizens; all physicians see all citizens; state-wide "sickness funds" (the German 
equivalent to something like insurance "co-ops") are open for contract with any citizen; 
and freedom of choice across all physicians, hospitals, and sickness funds of the state of 
residence is maintained for the whole population. Sickness funds are modeled on one of 
the oldest insurance institutions of the western world: perhaps the "credit union" is the 
closest type of institution in the United States. The "funds" operate as non-profit 
agencies, each governed by elected members of fund itself. They raise financial 
resources through required collections from their members, and the collection rates are 
decided by each fund on the basis of the projected health needs ofthe members. All 
sickness funds are overseen and regulated by both the federal government and their 
respective Lander. 
In addition, the Lander governments are often organized in regional ministries 
that are responsible for the administration and regulation of a number of health-related 
categories, including public health services and environmental hygiene; health 
promotion, prevention and AIDS care; state-owned hospitals and hospital planning; 
supervision of health professions and corresponding professional institutions; psychiatric 
services and illegal drugs; pharmaceuticals and supervision of pharmacists and their 
professional institutions (European Observatory, 25). 
There are also important corporate aspects in the German healthcare system. 
Physicians' and dentists' legal associations and the sickness funds mentioned above are 
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all organized as corporations, and these corporate institutions provide each group with 
political and legal representation whenever necessary. 
Health care regulatory and planning responsibilities are specified and assigned to 
the federal government, the Lander, and the corporations, by the so-called Social Code 
Book. The central government regulates and administers the following aspects of the 
system: mandatory and voluntary membership in sickness funds; content of the sickness 
funds' benefits packages; goals and scope of negotiation between the sickness funds and 
health care providers; organizational structure of sickness funds and their associations; 
financing mechanisms including risk compensation schemes across funds; tasks and 
organization of medical review boards; collection, storage, use, and protection of data; 
special regulations for the eastern part of Germany (European Observatory, 30). 
Maintenance of hospitals' infrastructure, public health services such as hygiene and 
monitoring of transmissible diseases, and medical educational curricula are instead within 
the scope of the Lander's responsibilities. Finally, it is the corporate aspect of the 
sickness funds that negotiates fees, quality, and quantity of insured services on behalf of 
all members, and that collects and manages funds. The medical and dental corporate 
associations are responsible for the provision of all personal health care services, 
including ambulance services. While these corporations have substantial decisional 
power in the administration and delivery of health care, there is a clear web of regulations 
administered by public entities, including the Federal Ministry of Health that contains 
and oversees their decisional freedom. Clearly, the organization of the health care system 
in Germany is public and highly decentralized, with most of the administrative and 
delivery responsibilities carried on by the regional districts (Lander). 
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The basic benefits included in the public plans are prevention, screening, and 
treatment of disease, and transportation. There are also private health insurance 
companies, even though they cover only 7.1 million individuals, less than 10% ofthe 72 
million covered by the government's program and the sickness funds. 
The socio-economic breakdown of the participation in the healthcare system is 
also of particular interest. Because individuals with sufficient income can effectively 
choose whether to receive health care through public or private insurance, sickness fund 
membership is only required for people below a certain income level. Thus, 88% of the 
population participates in the governmental system, 9% use private health insurance, 2% 
are public employees with free health care, and only 0.1% of the population is uninsured 
(European Observatory, 39). The financial means of the sickness funds come from 
members' contributions, and such contributions are based on members' income and not 
on members' risk levels. Their contribution also covers non-working spouses and 
dependent children. For the employed, the employer and the employee split the 
contribution to the fund evenly. Sickness funds are responsible for paying members for 
missed work (80% of income) after the first six weeks during which employers are 
required to pay regular salary (1 00%). While statutory insurance is the main source of 
funding for health care in Germany, taxes are also used; finally, private funds finance the 
relatively small private insurance market. 
One area of the public system that has been recently under particular scrutiny and 
that will require adjustments and reforms is the containment of the overall excessive cost 
of health care. In this regard the German government has already initiated change, such 
as a budgeting process for sectors or individual providers; reference price setting for 
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pharmaceuticals; restrictions on high cost technology equipment and number of 
ambulatory care physicians per geographic planning region; and increased co-payments 
(European Observatory, 107-108). These decisions have already proven effective in 
moderating the growth of costs in the health care sector, and have begun to stabilize the 
contribution levels in the sickness funds. 
2.2 Second Case Study: Great Britain 
The United Kingdom operates under a national, government run and regulated 
system called the National Health Service or NHS. The program was established in 1948 
but has undergone substantial changes ever since. Unlike the German health care system, 
the NHS is a program that is run completely by the central government. The NHS is 
what is known as a single-payer system: this means that one institution, in this case the 
central government, is responsible for paying for all health care. In the United Kingdom, 
care from the NHS is free to all participants, because it is completely paid for through tax 
revenues. While the federal government regulates the NHS, specifics of the system 
slightly vary across England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In this section the 
focus will be on the English branch of the NHS. 
The NHS defines itself as a universal service for all, based on clinical need rather 
than ability to pay. Its core values are outlined in its mission, which includes providing a 
comprehensive range of service; shaping its services around the needs and preferences of 
individual patients, their families, and their caretakers; responding to different needs of 
different populations; and working continuously to improve the quality of services while 
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healthcare solely for the benefit of patients; and finally embracing proactive behaviors to 
keep people healthy and reduce health inequality. 
The NHS is a highly bureaucratic system, with overlapping regulations that come 
from a hierarchical ladder of public institutions and agencies. The highest level of control 
over the operations of the NHS comes from the national Parliament. The Acts of 
Parliament (that involve both houses) are the primary way in which legislation is passed 
on the health services in England and Wales. While there is constant debate on how 
involved the government should be in the health care system, there is an implicit limit on 
how disengaged the national government can be from the administration and regulation 
of the health care system, and this is due to the fact that funding of the NHS relies on tax 
revenues, the use of which is responsibility of the Parliament. (Rivett) 
The next level of the regulatory ladder is occupied by the Secretary of State for 
Health. This position is part of the cabinet of the Prime Minister and is responsible for all 
actions that pertain to the Department of Health, which is the main governing body of the 
National Health Service. The Department of Health oversees the modernization of the 
NHS and maintains responsibility over the general health of the country. Its roles can be 
summarized as: setting overall direction and leading transformation of the NHS and of 
social care; setting national standards; securing resources and making major investment 
decisions to ensure that the NHS and social care have the capacity to deliver; working 
with key partners such as the so-called Strategic Health Authorities and the Care Quality 
Commission to ensure a minimum quality of health services. (Rivett) 
The Strategic Health Authorities manage the NHS in their designated areas of the 
country. These Strategic Health Authorities are the key link between health services and 
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the Department of Health. In fact, they can be considered agencies of the Department of 
Health that carry out the Department's directives. Their responsibilities include 
developing plans for improving health services in their local areas; making sure local 
health services are of a high quality and are performing well; increasing the capacity of 
local health services so that they can provide more services; making sure that national 
priorities (for example, programs for improving cancer services) are integrated into local 
health service plans (NHS, 201 0). The Strategic Health Authorities also oversee the 
different branches of the NHS in their assigned geographical areas; such branches are 
known as "trusts," which are further subdivided depending on the specific services 
provided. There are five different types of trusts: Primary Care Trusts, Acute Trusts, 
Ambulance Trusts, Care Trusts, and Mental Health Trusts. 
The Primary Care Trusts are local organizations that are supposed to effectively 
recognize all of the community's health care needs. They are responsible for providing 
primary care and community services, and they may commission specific tasks to outside 
organizations. Primary Care Trusts set their own budgets and priorities vis-a-vis the 
larger goals set by the Department of Health and the Strategic Health Authority of their 
region. These trusts are responsible for employing the physicians in the area and making 
sure that the number of primary care physicians is appropriate for the population. 
Primary Care Trusts currently control approximately 80% of the NHS budget. (NHS, 
2010). 
Acute Trusts are responsible for, regulate, and oversee public hospitals. They are 
responsible for the quality of health care services provided by the hospitals of their 
jurisdiction, for their effective and efficient use of funds, and for development planning 
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of individual units. Acute Trusts are the largest employers of all trusts, and are 
responsible for hiring all nurses, doctors, pharmacists, etc., that are employed in the 
hospitals of their geographical areas. (NHS, 2010) 
Ambulance and Mental Health Trusts are self-explanatory, while Care Trusts 
have generic tasks that typically combine activities also performed under the auspices of 
Primary Care and Mental Health Trusts. There are very few Care Trusts in England. 
(NHS, 2010) 
The NHS is very much intended to be a system that is "free at the point of 
delivery." This means that members of the NHS pay nothing when they actually receive 
service, because they have theoretically paid for it already through taxes. Tax revenues 
are allocated by the Department of Health to the Trusts, and then Trusts are responsible 
for all disbursements to physicians and others that directly provide health care. While 
taxpayer money is the main source of funds for the NHS, the government also uses 
additional sources to further fund the national health care system, such as car park fees 
and charges for specific prescriptions. Finally, private health insurances are also 
available, to the discretion of the more well-off portion of the population. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Both the German and British health care systems guarantee care to all individuals; the 
way they achieve universal coverage however reflect the level of federalism that 
characterize their governments. Germatty has a strong federal structure, with political and 
administrative power clearly layered between central and regional governments: 
correspondingly, the German public health care system is based on decentralization of 
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administrative and regulatory responsibilities. The British political system is highly 
centralized in Westminster: correspondingly, it is the Parliament and the Prime Minister's 
cabinet that maintain most of the regulatory and administrative power for public 
healthcare. The British system thus is based more on delegation than decentralization. 
Both public health care systems were established a relatively long time ago, and 
the private health insurance market developed with a strong public system already in 
place. This makes the comparison between these systems and the American system quite 
complex, as the U.S. faces opposite circumstances: a well-established market of private 
health insurance companies, and a still-to-be-born public system. The challenge is such 
that an American public system may never find sufficient economic and political support. 
Yet, even though well-established, the American private health care system reveals a 
major shortcoming that the current administration is determined to repair: a vast number 
of citizens who cannot access health c~e. In the next chapter, the two main reform 
proposals currently discussed in Congress will be outlined. One resembles in many 
important ways the genuinely European systems outlined in this chapter, while the other 
would superimpose a stricter regulatory system to the existing structure, which would 
remain fundamentally unaltered. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE CURRENT HEALTHCARE REFORM PROPOSALS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States is the only industrialized country in the world that does not 
guarantee health care coverage to all its citizens. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate 
the main reform plans proposed in the United States legislature to rectify this 
fundamental shortcoming. What is presented here is fact: the statements and information 
contained in this chapter come directly from the bills that the House of Representatives 
and the United States Senate respectively produced in their committees. The hope is to 
shed some light on the very complex web of reform proposals and sub-proposals, and on 
some of the effects that different options may have on the American health insurance 
market and on the "health" of the country, a topic that will be more specifically explored 
in the third and final chapter of this thesis. 
The legislative bills that are being proposed and discussed in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to address universal health care coverage in the United 
States embody a variety of approaches and ways of achieving similar ends. While one 
proposal may include a certain restriction on the private health insurance market, another 
may not find that restriction necessary. Two bills are currently under scrutiny: 
"America's Affordable Health Choices Act of2009" (HR 3200) in the House of 
Representatives, and "America's Healthy Future Act of2009" in the Senate. Also in the 
mix is the bill that President Barack Obama endorsed as a way to signal Congress his 
view of the content of the legislation he would like to see passed by both House and 
Senate. 
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The complexity and the economic and political nuances of the proposals currently 
on the table require detailed scrutiny. Focusing on the two healthcare reform proposals 
currently at the House and at the Senate, the following pages provide a review of the 
fundamental objectives of each proposal, paying particular attention to key differences 
between the two bills and to the highly debated possibility for the government to enter the 
healthcare market as a competitor of private insurance companies. 
At the current time there is no public health insurance plan in the United States 
for individuals who are not disabled, significantly impoverished (Medicaid), or under the 
age of 65 (Medicare). It is possible that one or both of these plans could be expanded to 
include all Americans; however, it has long been the expectation in the United States that 
the working age population would be responsible for its own health insurance, unless 
there is some factor that keeps individuals from doing so. Also, a large portion of the 
population of the United States has long identified with a purely capitalist system, and 
there does not seem to be a significant percentage of the population who would like this 
to change. Because of this system, it would be very difficult to remove the health 
insurance for-profit market, because it would deprive private companies of the acquired 
right to sell health services in a private market. Thus, any public health insurance plan 
that may be developed would likely be based on something new, not an extension of a 
program that is already in place. One fundamental topic is the so called "public option," 
which in May 2009 has been described by the Senate Finance Committee as conceivable 
according to three different models. The public option consists of the addition of another 
health care provider to the health insurance market, and it would be run by the federal 
government. This brings up many topics of discussion and disagreement as some believe 
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that an expansion of the government would be a shift toward socialism and also that a 
government operated health insurance system would be necessarily inefficient. Others 
however think that this change would be extremely beneficial in that it could help to 
control the ever rising health insurance costs in the United States. 
The first version of the public option would be a Medicare-like plan: the plan 
would be run and governed by the Department of Health and Human Services, and thus 
would be a source of insurance that would come directly from the government. 
Healthcare providers would be reimbursed according to the same methods followed for 
Medicare. This public option would operate within the health insurance exchange that 
the private plans would operate in. This exchange is a market that would be set up to 
group all of the options, whether public or private, so that consumers can see all of the 
options side by side and select the one that is the best for them. The public plan would be 
held to all of the same rating rules that the private health plans would be held to in the 
insurance exchange. Thus, other than because of its government administration, the 
"public option" would likely be identical to the private insurance options also offered 
through the insurance exchange. This plan is what we will see in the proposal from the 
House of Representatives. 
The second proposal for a public option would be structured according to a third 
party administrators idea. This would be a plan that, although functionally identical to 
Medicare, would be run by regional non-governmental third party administrators rather 
than by the Department of Health and Human Services. The third party administrators 
would therefore operate independently, and would report back to the government. The 
reimbursement structures would be arranged between third party administrators and 
27 
healthcare providers as relationships are established. Differently from the Medicare-like 
plan discussed earlier, these third parties would be required to maintain reserve funds. 
The Medicare-like plan is de facto a government-run insurance; thus, whenever the plan 
pays more than it receives in premiums and co-pays, the government would directly bail 
the plan out. Non-governmental third parties would instead be required to have sufficient 
funds as the government would not be directly involved in, nor responsible for, balancing 
their budgets. 
The third version of public option, which would not necessarily guarantee the 
creation of a public health insurance option in every state, consists of state-run health 
insurance plans. In this case the federal government would determine specific 
characteristics and criteria of the public insurance plans, but both set-up and 
administration of each plan would be completely left to state governments. Similarly to 
the case of Medicaid, the federal government would be responsible for most of the 
funding. Some states may choose not to offer such public plans. This plan has the 
potential for the federal government to make the provision of public health care insurance 
an option to states and not mandatory. According to this proposal, states may also have 
the option to extend existing state-employee insurance plans to non-employees rather 
than establish a newly created public healthcare insurance. 
The remainder of this chapter offers a description of what each reform proposal 
contains. In the bill from the House of Representatives, a proposal that includes a public 
option is outlined, fitting the description of the Medicare-like plan. Then, in the Senate 
bill, a different proposal that does not include a public option but establishes alternative 
ways to increase the number of insured people in the United States is outlined. 
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3.1 The House Bill 
The first proposal on Capitol Hill is the public health insurance option outlined in 
the House of Representatives' bill known as "America's Affordable Health Choices Act 
of2009" (H.R. 3200). The bill states, "The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ... shall provide for the offering of an exchange-participating health benefits plan 
that ensures choice, competition and stability of affordable, high quality coverage 
throughout the United States ... " (H.R 3200, pp. 116) This statement may represent the 
first step in the provision of universal healthcare in the United States: there is a clear 
statement of purpose, which is the provision of affordable quality health care to all, 
without necessarily mandating the government to become neither the only provider nor 
one of the providers of health care insurance. Thus, the above statement per se does not 
make the public option a viable, feasible reform action. For a public option to be viable 
and effective there need to be sufficient regulation and specific guarantees of efficiency. 
H.R. 3200 also states that the public health insurance option must "comply with 
requirements that are applicable ... to an exchange-participating health benefits plan, 
including requirements relating to benefits, benefit levels, provider networks, notices, 
consumer protections and cost sharing." (H.R. 3200, pp. 116-117) Thus, according to 
this bill, a public healthcare insurance would act like a private insurance that participates 
in the healthcare insurance exchange. The insurance exchange would provide individuals 
with reliable information on different quality insurance plans, and therefore with effective 
comparison tools. To be eligible to operate within the health insurance exchange, a plan 
would have to meet the specific criteria that, according to H.R. 3200, characterize a 
"Qualified Health Benefits Plan" (QHBP). The bill specifies regulations on what levels 
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of plans may be offered (basic, enhanced, etceteras), what events may cause the 
expulsion of a QHBP from the exchange, and how any affordability credits would be 
dispersed to the plans acting in the exchange (how the government would reimburse 
QHBPs for insuring impoverished individuals). 
The great majority of the American population would purchase insurance through 
the exchange program. The operational requirements outlined in the bill suggest that the 
public insurance option would have to abide by the same rules that apply to private 
companies. This set up clearly establishes a leveled playing field between public and 
private insurance companies, and suggests the intention to maintain a high (potentially 
higher) degree of competitiveness in the health insurance market. 
Administration and funding of the House's public healthcare insurance proposal 
are among the most debated aspects of the plan itself: in H.R. 3200, the official provider 
(company) responsible for the public option and its operation within the insurance 
exchange market would be the Secretary of Health and Human Services. When 
compared with the other public insurance options described earlier in this chapter, this is 
what makes this proposal very similar to Medicare, as the Federal government would be 
directly in charge of operation and service. The funding of the program also requires 
detailed scrutiny: would premiums be set so low that the federal government would have 
to make up the difference through other budgetary sources? How would the start-up costs 
be financed? The House's bill clearly describes start-up funding, which would be 
financed by 2 billion dollars of non-appropriated Treasury funds and by the expected 
value of 90 days worth of claims that would be made against the plan prior to the 












for the plan to pay for the care of its customers for the first 90 days, and after that the 
plan would be required to use the collected premiums to function. Thus, start-up costs for 
this public plan are evaluated to be well beyond the $2 billion benchmark, and an 
important question to ask is whether these funds are actually available and affordable for 
the United States at this time. 
Operational costs, instead, should be mostly financed through premiums: the bill 
states that premiums will be established geogmphically by the secretary in a manner "that 
complies with the premium rules established ... for exchange-participating health benefit 
plans" and "at a level sufficient to fully finance the costs." Thus the bill seems to suggest 
overall revenues from premiums sufficient to cover operational costs, even within the 
scope of the initiative to provide healthcare insurance to all. A Treasury account would 
be responsible for disbursements out of deposits received and formally appropriated start-
up government's funds described above. In addition, H.R. 3200 mandates that 
reimbursement rates for services provided under the plan shall be set to rates similar to 
those currently paid to providers under Medicare parts A and B, which are the sections on 
hospital insurance and health insurance (doctor visits, tests, etc.) 
The House bill details specific criteria for affordability credits. First of all, 
affordability credits given by the government may be used only to purchase basic 
coverage plans through the exchange described in the bill. Any further coverage that an 
individual eligible for affordability credit wishes to purchase must be paid directly by that 
individual. The bill mandates that affordability credits would be available to individuals 
with incomes at or below the "400% of the federal poverty level" benchmark; individuals 
with income sufficiently low so that they would qualify for Medicaid must enroll in 
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Medicaid and will not be given affordability credits. Affordability credits would also not 
made available to illegal immigrants. The following table reports the categorization of 
affordability credits according to the HR 3200: 














Individuals who are eligible to affordability credits would have access to two different 
forms of credit. The first is the affordable premium credit, designed to help the eligible 
individual afford the premium on the basic plan that would be purchased from an 
insurance provider that participates in the exchange. The second would be an affordable 
cost-sharing credit. This credit would be designed to help individuals pay the amount 
they would be required to pay at the time of their visit (co-pay), based on the basic plan 
that they have purchased from an exchange participating health insurance plan. 
Finally, in order to encourage wide provider participation in the plan, rates would 
be increased by five percent during the first 3 years. The bill also establishes 
requirements, conditions, and specific qualifications for physicians and providers, 
character of services included in the plan, and conditions, rules, and procedures for 
claims of fraud, abuse, etceteras. 
3.2 The Senate Bill 
On October 13, 2009, the Senate Finance Committee finally passed its own 
healthcare reform bill that was then proposed to the Senate for a vote. The bill is clearly 
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meant to increase the overall coverage ofhealthcare insurance in the United States, but 
does not include a public option or public healthcare insurance plan. More precisely, the 
bill focuses on making healthcare insurance in the country more affordable and accessible 
rather than on foreseeing ways in which the federal (or state) government might directly 
intervene in the provision of health care insurance to all. This is a bill that, through the 
already established tax credits and insurance exchange, would reform the healthcare 
insurance private market by making healthcare generally affordable. Interestingly, 
according to the Finance Committee's proposal the insurance exchange would be run at a 
state rather than national level, with the consequence that individuals in different states 
most likely would have access to different plans. State exchanges would be given initial 
funding from the federal government but would then be expected to function solely on 
the basis of the revenues received from the participants in the exchange itself. 
The main novelty of the Senate Finance Committee's proposal consists in 
establishing guidelines for the possible development of Consumer Operated-Oriented 
Plan programs, known as CO-OP. These programs are meant to introduce non-for-profit, 
member-run health insurance companies in the market. The bill calls for the allocation of 
$6 billion in government assistance to finance CO-OPs' start-up costs, and establishes 
strict rules on profit reinvestment, that has to be targeted towards making health 
insurance policies more affordable and therefore should have the effect of lowering 
policy premiums. Regulations would be set so that these insurance companies would not 
enjoy any specific advantage in their market operations. 
Also the Senate bill is quite explicit in regard to affordability credits that in this 






































individuals who have paid the full premium to the qualified (not necessarily exchange 
participating) insurance plan, can then claim the amount paid in their income tax return 
for that calendar year. The other option for the consumer to obtain this credit is for the 
individual to send their portion of the premium to the Treasury and then the Treasury 
sends the full premium to the insurance company. The bill mandates that these credits 
would be available to all individuals whose modified gross income lies between 133% 
and 400% of the poverty level. This bill clearly allocates affordability credits to fewer 
individuals than the house's bill. Individuals with an income at 134% of the poverty 
level would be responsible for a share of the premium capped at 2% of their income; 
individuals with higher incomes would be responsible for shares of the premium 
established according to a sliding scale that reaches a maximum for those with an income 
at 400% of the poverty level, who would be responsible for premiums capped at 12% of 
their income. In addition to the premium tax credit there is also a subsidy in this bill that 
would help to pay for the cost-share required by the health plan. In this case, the subsidy 
would only be available for those who are at 200% of poverty or lower. The Senate bill 
also includes a tax credit for small businesses as an incentive for them to provide their 
employees with an insurance option. Finally, also the Finance Committee's bill excludes 
illegal immigrants from eligibility for the federal healthcare tax credit. 
3.3 Other proposals 
As said earlier, the Senate Finance Committee did not include a public option 
clause in its reform bill. There were however a number of public option proposals that 
were submitted in conjunction with the Finance Committee's plan. An interesting 
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amendment was proposed to the Senate Finance Committee by Senator Jay Rockefeller, 
who brought forth the idea of an exchange-qualified health benefit plan that would 
operate "on a level playing field" with private insurance companies already operating in 
the exchange. The public plan would be required to offer the same policies and abide by 
the same rules as their private competitors would be required to. Senator Rockefeller's 
proposal is almost identical to the public health insurance option outlined in the House of 
Representatives' bill, including premium costs, appropriations to fund set-up costs, and 
all the regulations outlined in HR 3200. With eight votes in favor and fifteen votes 
against it, this amendment was voted do"Wn by the Finance Committee. The other public 
option amendment proposed to the Senate Finance Committee was brought forth by 
Senator Charles Schumer. 
Another proposal brought to the Finance Committee resembled a public option 
plan, but embodied a different set of guidelines. This plan, proposed by Senator Olympia 
Snowe, was called "trigger option." This plan has two ways to make sure that an 
affordable plan is available to 95% of people in a state through that state's exchange 
program. Whenever this percentage of affordable plans is not met, an additional non-
profit, government-run plan would be "triggered" with the intent of providing a safety net 
available to all individuals. It is important to recognize that, within the guidelines of this 
bill, this public health insurance option would only be available in those states that do not 
meet the 95% affordability, and thus a government-run insurance plan would not be 
necessarily operating in every state. This plan could have had enough support to gain the 
60 votes necessary to break a filibuster by Republican senators. 
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Whatever bill passes the majority in Congress and Senate will then have to be 
signed into law by the President. The President has the power to veto any bill that falls 
short of some fundamental content that in his opinion should characterize the healthcare 
reform bill, and in such case the bill would return to Congress for further revision. A few 
main points from the President's plan include: development of an exchange that would 
allow individuals and small businesses to compare plans and find competitive rates; tax 
credits to help people and small businesses buy insurance; creation of a public plan that 
would provide a real alternative to individuals who cannot afford plans in the exchange; 
immediate creation of a "high risk" pool meant to keep affordable premiums for people 
who may have pre-existing conditions; elimination of all healthcare insurance 
discriminations based on pre-existing conditions, gender, or age; and establishment of 
caps on out-of-pocket expenses for individuals 
3.4 Conclusion 
Given the complexity of each bill, a schematic summary of stylized facts of the 
health care reform bills of the House and the Senate may be helpful: 
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House Senate 
- Continues to promote a public - Would not offer a public option 
option 
- Insurance exchanges would be 
- Insurance exchange is nation-wide state-by-state 
- Subsidies would be available to 
-
Subsidies would be available to people at 400% of the poverty level 
people at 400% of the poverty level and lower 
and lower 
-
Basic plan covers 60% of costs and 
- Basic plan covers 70% of costs and has a $5,950 out-of-pocket limit 
has a $5,000 out-of-pocket limit 
-
Would not remove the anti-trust 
-
Removes anti-trust exemption exemption but regulations within 
currently held by health insurance the market are greatly increased 
companies 
-
Children may remain on parents 
-
Children can remain on their insurance until 25 
parents insurance until age 26 
-
Illegal immigrants are completely 
-
Illegal immigrants may by prohibited from purchasing 
insurance through the exchange but insurance through the exchange 
may not receive federal subsidies 
-
Bill would cost $871 billion and 
-
Bill would cost $1.052 trillion and reduce deficits by $132 billion 
would reduce deficits by $139 
-
31 million people would gain 
billion insurance and 23 million would 
-
36 million people would gain remain uninsured 
coverage with just 18 million 
-
40% tax on over-priced health 
uninsured plans, fees from participants in the 
-
Taxes high-income people and the insurance market, $483 billion from 
sale of medical devices to pay for Medicare growth, increase in 
plan, along with $404 billion Medicare payroll tax rate, and a tax 
coming from projected growth in on indoor tanning services 
Medicare 
Many tides of change and counter-change on the healthcare reform proposals 
have come and gone since this thesis began, and facts, nuances of each proposal, and 
information have continued to change on a daily basis. On March 21, 2010, the United 
States House of Representatives passed a reconciled version of the Senate bill, and sent a 








































means that the House of Representatives has chosen to accept the Senate version of the 
bill--with minor changes that the Senate passed right away--. Projections of the new law 
suggest that 32 million Americans previously without health insurance will be able to 
obtain quality affordable coverage. Health insurance exchanges wiii be created so that 
Americans can have more bargaining power vis-a-vis insurance companies. Insurance 
exchanges will be set up on a state-by-state basis, as the Senate proposed, and separate 
exchanges will be created in each state for small businesses so that they also may more 
easily manage health insurance costs. States would also receive federal funding to 
operate these exchanges until2015. Subsidies for low-income Americans will be 
available to those individuals between 100% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL). In order to qualify for subsidies, individuals may lose eligibility for Medicare and 
Medicaid, and cannot be covered by an employer. Eligible individuals will receive 
premium credits and there is a sliding scale that limits out of pocket expenses. Currently, 
the FPL is $22,050 for a family of four. The subsidies operate according to the table 
below: 
Percentage of Poverty Initial Premium Final Premium 
Percentage Percentage 
Up to 133% 2.0% 2.0% 
133% up to 150% 3.0% 4.0% 
150% up to 200% 4.0% 6.3% 
200% up to 250% 6.3% 8.05% 
250% up to 300% 8.05% 9.5% 
300% up to 400% 9.5% 9.5% 
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Three changes to the federal tax structure are introduced to pay for the additional 
spending caused by the new bill. Families with income above $250,000 will now pay a 
3.8% tax on investment or unearned income. Also, insurance companies will be required 
to pay a 40% tax on "Cadillac" plans, and finally, there will be a new 10% tax on indoor 
tanning. There will be major changes to the Medicare prescription "donut hole," closing 
the gap by 2020. Medicaid will be expanded to include individuals with income up to 
133% of the FPL, and will also begin to cover childless adults. Also, Medicaid will not 
cover illegal immigrants, and the United States government will cover newly eligible 
individuals through 2016. 
Most importantly, insurance companies will no longer be able to deny coverage 
based on pre-existing conditions, and children may stay on their parent's insurance until 
the age of 26. Abortion will not be paid for through federal funds, but there is no 
provision as to whether insurance exchange participating plans may or may not offer 
coverage for abortion. There will be an individual mandate that will begin in 2014 that 
will require all individuals to purchase insurance or face a $695 penalty, with some 
exceptions for low-income Americans. The bill does not introduce any employer 
mandate. Finally, illegal immigrants will not be allowed to purchase insurance through 
an exchange, even if they pay entirely out of pocket. 
Even though this bill will have the effect of greatly expanding the percentage of 
the population able to purchase quality health insurance, it still falls short of providing 
universal health coverage to all individuals. The absence of a public option will still leave 
a few million f\111ericans without the guarantee of receiving health care when needed. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE HEALTH CARE 
MARKET 
One of the most important points in the health care debate that the previous 
chapter has hopefully clarified refers to the fundamental decision of whether or not the 
U.S. government should be acting as a competitor in the healthcare markets. The split in 
the population's preferences in this regard is fairly sharp: some believe that it is necessary 
for the government to step in and provide the public with a health insurance option, while 
others think that this would be too much, as there are fears that the government could 
possibly out-compete private insurance companies. The more conservative portion of the 
population wants the government to simply take action in regulating health care so that 
prices are controlled and quality of service may increase. 
This chapter explores the key variables that affect the overall health of a nation 
(statistics and ratings that grade the health of individuals in a country: life expectancy, 
mortality rates, etc.) vis-a-vis government participation in the health care system. The 
fundamental questions asked are: Does the amount of health care that is provided by the 
government make a difference in the health of the nation, and is there a threshold beyond 
which the government might be providing too much? Is the relationship between the 
amount of government involvement in health care and overall health really based solely 
on the overall well-being of a country as measured by the Gross Domestic Product? Is 
education, that is, the ability of the population to make informed, educated decisions 
about health, more fundamental than who administers health services and under what 
conditions these services are provided? This chapter approaches these questions 
40 
empirically, using data and statistics collected from studies performed by the United 
Nations and the World Health Organization, with the hope to find econometric evidence 
of whether there is a significant relationship between government involvement and 
health. 
The dependent variables examined in this econometric analysis are: the health 
outcome index published by World Health Organization in the 2000 issue of the World 
Health Report, which is based on data from 1997; life expectancy (at birth), and mortality 
rate (probability of dying between 15 and 60 per 1000 population) for 169 countries, 
based on data since 2006 published by the World Health Organization's Statistical 
Information System. Corollary data was also collected from the United Nations' Human 
Development Reports. 
4.1 Review of Relevant Literature 
Important scholarly literature has already been published on the topic. In the 
article "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?" (1996), David Cutler and 
Jonathan Gruber discuss the fundamental question that seems to be preventing the public 
insurance option from passing in Congress right now: they emphasize that the problem 
that could come from an increased amount of public insurance is that if many people 
were to drop their private coverage in favor of a public insurance option; the public 
insurance could lose some of its "bang for the buck" (391). In their paper, Cutler and 
Gruber "provide evidence ofthe effect of public health insurance eligibility on private 
insurance coverage" (392), by describing theoretically and showing empirically the 
amount of crowding out that would ensue from an increase in public healthcare 
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insurance. Their findings and conclusions show that the addition of more public coverage 
will significantly crowd out private insurance, and most of this will come from 
employees dropping the (private) coverage provided by their companies for the less 
expensive public plan. The assumption that drives the conclusion is that the public plan 
turns out to be cheaper than private ones. 
In the article "Reorganizing the Health Insurance Market," published in 1992, 
Peter Diamond offers a preservation scheme that would reorganize the health insurance 
market to make health care affordable and available to everyone in the United States. He 
points out that the existing private health insurance market is subject to characteristics 
that cause the market to lack competitive equilibria (1237). He emphasizes the fact that 
private insurances reject potential customers on the basis of pre-existing conditions, 
making it difficult for a large fraction of the population to obtain quality affordable health 
care. He recommends that people should be able to select any insurance at one price for a 
plan, no matter their health situation. Diamond proposes that the government creates 
large groups of population, which are identified geographically; each group would 
purchase health insurance as a unit. This would give these groups more bargaining 
power, and force health insurances to offer one price to each entire group. Even though 
such proposal was written in 1992, it still fits very well into the current reform plans, as it 
is a sort of insurance exchange. In Diamond however the government would not act as a 
health insurance provider, but as the overseer of the healthcare companies, to make sure 
they provide coverage in a fair, affordable, and universal way. This plan would be 
particularly effective in avoiding crowding out of the private insurance companies, and 
would be creating a way in which the companies could be regulated and monitored. 
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The report, "Public and Private Roles in Health: Theory and Financing Patterns" 
(1996), published by the World Bank, also provides an extensive look at how the 
government should operate in the health insurance market. Similarly to Diamond's 
article, the report recommends that the government focus on regulating the insurance 
companies; if and whenever regulation does not resolve the problem of adverse selection, 
the government should step in and directly finance and administer health insurance. The 
report also recommends that the government subsidize insurance for the poorest portion 
of the population, either through minimum healthcare or by subsidizing private 
companies so that they would provide coverage. The report makes it clear that the 
government should take actions so that public revenues obtained from the cross-section 
of the population (such as income taxes) subsidize coverage for the wealthiest citizens. 
Also, the government should not act in ways that may lead to outcompeting private 
insurances, and should let competition between public and private insurance be based on 
anything other than cost and quality. To both contain public-private competition and 
avoid likely abuse of cheap or free-of-charge public healthcare services, the report 
recommends that the government limit the range and scope of health care services that 
would be publicly provided. The government should be promoting competition by 
providing competitive services to the public and/or by regulating the private companies. 
Many scholars believe that the change in health care in the United States should 
start from learning from those who actually provide care (doctors, etc.) what exactly 
should be done. In the article "A National Health Program for the United States: A 
Physicians Proposal" published in 1989, the two medical doctors David U. Himmelstein 
and Steffie Woolhandler lay out a new and radical health care program for the United 
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-States. Their plan include six fundamental ideas: "(1) fully cover everyone under a 
single, comprehensive public insurance program; (2) pay hospitals and nursing homes a 
total (global) annual amount to cover all operating expenses; (3) fund capital costs 
through separate appropriations; (4) pay for physicians' services and ambulatory services 
in any of three ways ... ; (5) be funded, at least initially, from the same sources as at 
present, but with all payments disbursed from a single pool; and (6) contain costs through 
savings on billing and bureaucracy, improved health planning, and the ability of the 
national health program, as the single payer for services, to establish overall spending 
limits"(! 02). According to their analysis, such multi-faceted and quite subvertive plan 
would effectively eliminate financial barriers to health insurance and simplify hospital 
administration, making more resources available for direct care. All private insurance 
companies would be eliminated in such plan, and the government would be the only 
provider of health insurance in the country. The economic justification they provide for 
their plan would be in the substantial savings that American businesses and corporations 
would have to sustain to extend healthcare benefits to all employees. 
Schoen, Davis, and Collins lay out a less dramatic overhaul plan that would still 
achieve universal coverage in the United States, by using a mixed public and private 
health insurance structure. In the recent article "Building Blocks for Reform: Achieving 
Universal Coverage with Private and Public Group Health Insurance" (2008), the authors 
propose a plan that is in many ways similar to the healtbcare reform proposal currently 
debated in Congress. The article, for instance, calls for a health connector that has 
functions similar to the insurance exchange market. It recommends a "play-or-pay" rule 
for employers, making them pay a tax if they choose not to offer insurance coverage to 
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their employees. The authors recommend creating a Medicare-like option for people 
under 65 to increase total coverage in the United States. They also, very helpfully, 
outline the spending changes that would result from the implementation of their plan. 
They conclude that the total spending on healthcare would increase by less than one 
percent from where it was in 2008, being offset by cuts in provider reimbursements and 
lowered administrative costs. 
Other scholars have based studies and reform proposals on comparative analysis 
of differences between other countries' healthcare systems and the United States' one. A 
fundamental regularity results from all these comparative studies: the United States 
spends much more on health care than any other country in the world. In "U.S. Health 
Care Spending In An International Context," (2004) Uwe Reinhardt, Peter Hussey, 
and Gerard Anderson attempt to explain such phenomenon. Even after one controls for 
the American ability to spend more on healthcare because of the relatively high GDP per 
capita, there is still a gap in health care spending of more than $1000 per capita. The 
authors attribute this difference to a variety of factors. First, people pay more for the 
same services in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries. This comes from the high 
reimbursement rates for physicians in the United States, and the fact that, because health 
insurance is purchased on an individual basis, insurance companies have more bargaining 
power than in other countries where contracts are signed either by groups or by 
government agencies. Another reason has to do with the complexity and inefficiency of 
the American administration and bureaucracy of health. Also, the United States has less 
effective control on the costs of pharmaceuticals, and the high costs of prescription drugs 
comparatively increases the cost of health care for many Americans. The authors use this 
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analysis of high costs of health care to discuss the fact that so many Americans remain 
uninsured. The bottom line is that many Americans cannot afford the cost of health 
insurance and are priced out of the market. Within the same tradition of comparative 
studies, in "Does universal health insurance make health care unaffordable? Lessons from 
Taiwan," (2003) Lu and Hsiao analyze the National Health Insurance (NHI) implemented 
in Taiwan in 1995 by addressing two basic questions: "Did the NHI cause Taiwanese 
health spending to escalate to an "unaffordable" level? What are the benefits of the 
NHI?" They point out that prior to the implementation of the NHI, 57% of the 
Taiwanese population had health insurance through three different providers; by the end 
of 1995, 92% of the population was enrolled and receiving health care; by the end of 
1996 such percentage had risen to 96%. They report that Taiwan was able to control the 
costs of health care by reducing transaction costs, and also by introducing tools and 
information deemed necessary to keep health insurance costs under control. The authors 
come to a conclusion that emphasizes the benefits of a government healthcare program, 
in terms of controlled costs and quality, and of course of a much higher percentage of the 
population with appropriate coverage. 
The two contributions that most directly speak to the specific content of this essay 
are the article "Government Intervention in Health Care Markets and Health Care 
Outcomes: Some International Evidence," published by Santerre, Grubaugh, and Stollar 
in 1991; and the paper "Government and Health Outcomes" published by Michael 
Grossman in 1982. Santerre, Grubaugh, and Stollar measure the degree of intervention of 
the government in the healthcare market by looking at the significance of the amount the 
government spends on healthcare as a percentage of the total amount spent on health care 
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in the country. The authors analyze data of20 countries that belong to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and conduct their research both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the paper argues that there is little evidence 
that the government can efficiently run a health care program for all Americans. 
Examples of failure such as the postal system and local public schools are used to 
undermine the validity of national public service programs. The authors run two separate 
regressions that use infant mortality as the health outcome, and in both instances they 
discover that the proportion of health care spending that is done by the government is not 
significantly related to the identified health outcome. Because of this analysis, the 
authors ultimately conclude that the original hypothesis that increased government 
intervention in health care would improve overall health, must be rejected . 
Michael Grossman's article emphasizes the role of education in the achievement 
of higher health outcomes: according to Grossman, many studies have been conducted on 
a variety of variables that may affect health outcomes, and education has been widely 
considered the most significant (often statistically significant at the .05 confidence level 
or better). While the author does not explicitly suggest a causal relationship between 
health outcomes and education, he repeatedly presents evidence to show that there is a 
significant relationship between these two variables, and that the educational effect on 
health outcomes cannot be ignored when trying to explain why a country may have 
higher life expectancy or lower mortality rate than others. Grossman's argument is 
convincing both from a theoretical and empirical perspective: education appears to have a 











































4.2 The Econometric Model 
This section presents an econometric model drawn in the spirit of the analysis 
conducted by Santerre, Grubaugh, and Stollar. The model considers a larger number of 
countries ( 169 countries from all over the world, rather than the 20 OECD countries 
considered in their paper) and more recent data, and includes education among the 
explanatory variables, as Grossman suggests. 
Three different equations wil1 be ultimately tested, that result :from a mostly basic 
linear model constructed for Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The basic set up of the 
model is: 
Health Outcome=Jio+JJ1(GDP)+JJ2(HC/GDP)+p3(Govt/IIC)+P4(Govt/HC)2+Ps(ED)+ Ei 
where: 
• Health Outcome: dependent variable, for the data from 1997 this is the WHO's 
health index. For the 2006 data, we will look at both life expectancy at birth and 
mortality rate; 
• GDP = per capita gross domestic product of a country in the year in question; 
• HC/GDP =percentage of gross domestic product that is spent on health care; 
• Govt!HC = percentage of total health care spending that is done by the 
government; 
• ED = a measure of education in a country. For both 1997 and 2006, this is a 












































The reason that a Govt/HC"2 variable is being used is because it seems reasonable that at 
some point, as the government provides more and more health care, the system could 
become what the authors of the first article mentioned, a failure of the government to 
effectively and efficiently run a public program, and no longer provide the better quality 
care that would help to improve the health outcomes in the country. Thus, we add the 
square of Govt/HC to account for a downturn in health outcomes as the variable takes 
larger and larger values. Coefficients for all of the above variables will be estimated 
using OLS by running the computer program Stata; the model's coefficients will then be 
tested for statistical significance and the model will be evaluated for its fit to the seven 
classical assumptions . 
The data set that was constructed for this analysis contains 5 categories of 
variables, with at least two separate observations for each as we are looking at both 1997 
and 2006. There are a total of 169 observations for each variable and the summary 
statistics of each is reported here below . 
St. 
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Min Max 
Health index 97 169 0.676 0.202 0.08 0.992 
GDP97 169 7644.5 8013.97 396.71 42872.83 
HC/GDP 97 169 5.72 2.3 1.7 14.7 
Govt/HC 97 169 55.45 19.94 7 92.5 
Ed 97 169 0.739 0.204 0.14 0.99 
Mortality 06 169 225.91 142.34 58 751 
Life Expectancy 
06 169 67.1 10.82 40 83 
GDP06 169 13512.8 14934.54 390.16 87825.46 
HC/GDP06 169 6.05 2.33 1.5 15.3 
Govt/HC 06 169 58.2 18.8 12.3 93 
Ed 06 169 0.794 0.175 0.282 0.993 
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For a quick look at the individual relationships that each key variable has with health 
outcomes, we examine the following scatter plots. This first graph shows GDP and the 
health index. There is a definite positive relationship, however heteroskedasticity could 
be prevalent. 
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This next graph is one of the health indexes and the percentage ofGDP spent on health 
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In the third plot, we display the relationship between the percentage of health care 
spending that is done by the government and the health index. Looking at this graph, 
there is a very clear positive correlation between the two. 
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The final graph that is to be examined is the relationship between education and the 
health index. A very strong positive relationship is revealed, and while there are a few 
observations that do not fit the trend, it seems rather obvious that education has positive 
effect on health outcomes. 
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8dffT 
The equation outlined earlier was run in Stata three different times, once with the 
1997 data, once with the 2006 data with mortality as the dependent variable, and once 
more with the 2006 data but with life expectancy as the dependent variable. Using a 
simple linear regression model, Stata produced the coefficients presented in the following 
tables: 
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VARIABLES Coefficients t-stats 
~ GDP97 1.00e-05*** 4.95 
lilt (2.02e-06) 
14 HC\GDP 97 0.00613 1.09 
~ (0.00563) Govt\HC 97 -0.00206 -.63 
-e (0.00325) 
...e Govt\HC 97"2 2.24e-05 .76 
~ (2.96e-05) Ed97 0.227*** 2.88 
..e (0.0786) 
~ Constant 0.433*** 4.48 
~ (0.0967) 
~ Observations 169 
~ R-squared 0.339 
~ Standard errors in parentheses 
~ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




VARIABLES Coefficients t-stats 
~ GDP06 -0.00256*** -3.75 
tA (0.000683) 
~ HC\GDP 06 -0.340 -.09 (3.919) 
tA Govt\HC 06 2.910 1.11 
tA (2.627) 
tA Govt\HC 06"2 -0.0242 -1.04 (0.0233) 
~ Ed06 -401.5*** -6.42 
tA (62.58) 
tA Constant 502.5*** 6.92 
~ (72.60) 
~ Observations 169 
~ R-squared 0.442 
tl& Standard errors in parentheses 
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2006 with Life Expectancy as Dependent Variable 
Life 
Expectancy 06 
VARIABLES Coefficients T-stats 
gdp07 0.000195*** 4.59 
(4.25e-05) 
hcgdp07 0.276 1.13 
(0.244) 
govthc07 -0.00805 -.05 
(0.163) 
govthc072 -6.54e-06 0 
(0.00145) 
ed07 37.03*** 9.51 
(3.894) 




Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
the various results of these estimations are at the same time surprising and to be 
expected. First of all, in all three cases two variables have coefficients that are 
statistically significant at all levels of significance: education and GDP per capita. This 
was clearly to be expected: as Grossman suggested in his article, there is strong evidence 
that the relationship between health outcomes and education would be strong and positive 
(in the sense that it would improve the outcome, so negative for mortality). The results 
for GDP also make sense: the more economically strong a country is, the greater the level 















































expectations and are significant, so one can safely assume that GDP per capita and 
education are important explanatory variables of the level of health achieved in a country. 
When trying to answer our main research question of whether or not a larger 
government involvement in health care would improve the overall health of a country, the 
output from Stat a does not produce the answer a progressive economist would have liked 
or even expected. Both the govt\hc and the govt\hcA2 variables (percentage of 
government spending on healthcare) are statistically insignificant at all levels of 
significance. This would seem to state that the amount of healthcare provided by the 
government is not as valuable when it comes to improving the health of a country. Also, 
it was my assumption that govt\hc would have a negative relationship up to a point, and 
then improve the country's health outcome (such was the reason for including the 
squared variable): in my expectations, govt\hc would have had a negative coefficient and 
the govt\hcA2 would have had a positive coefficient, producing a u-shaped regression. In 
the estimation, these variables had opposite signs than expected, suggesting that a higher 
amount of government involvement affects health outcomes negatively after a certain 
point, producing a hump-shaped graph. 
Some parts of the regressions may be violating some of the classical assumptions 
that make OLS the best estimator for the models, and corrections may be necessary. The 
first assumption that should be further analyzed is whether the model is linear, correctly 
specified, and has an additive error term. When looking at the model, one variable could 
clearly take another functional form. When evaluating GDP it may be more valuable to 
look at a percentage change in GDP rather than its unit change: this would switch GDP to 
ln(GDP). The following table shows the output for 1997 obtained by using ln(GDP): 
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VARIABLES Coefficients t-stats 
lngdp97 0.124*** 7.61 
(0.0164) 
hcgdp97 0.00601 1.16 
(0.00519) 
govthc97 -0.00458 -1.52 
(0.00301) 
govthc972 4.13e-05 1.52 
(2.72e-05) 
ed97 -0.0105 -.12 
(0.0844) 




Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l 
In this situation, the new specification ofGDP actually improved the overall fit ofthe 
model and made the govt\hc variables more significant, but not so much to become 
statistically significant. 
One of the classical assumptions is that the error term has a constant variance (no 
heteroskedasticity). The high variability in GDP and in its effects at low levels, and then 
less variability at higher levels, suggests the existence of positive heteroskedasticity: this 
again should be corrected to make the hypothesis tests more reliable. A Park test with 
respect to GDP has been run by using an intuitive proportionality factor. The following 
graph reports the residuals of GDP. 
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This graph presents clear evidence of heteroskedasticity as the residuals are clearly not 
constant. The following table is the output from Stat a resulting from the running of the 
Park test. 












Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Given the higher t-statistic on GDP, there is definitely some level ofheteroskedasticity in 
the model. The p-value that the output reports is .031, which means that at the 
heteroskedasticity is only existent at lower levels of significance. It seems unnecessary to 
adjust our regression because of this level ofheteroskedasticity. 
The econometric analysis is useful, but is clearly not without possible flaws. The 
basic econometric limitations of OLS have been already discussed, but there are other 
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possible flaws that could have an effect on the outcomes of the analysis. For example, in 
the econometric measurement, it is seen that education has a substantial explanatory 
power on health outcomes. That is valuable information but it can also cast a shadow 
over the rest of the variables in the model. With such strong correlation with education, 
the model tends to stick to that variable's path, and may blur the extent to which the 
inclusion of government in healthcare actually affects the outcomes of health. Also, 
among the many factors involved in the explanation of the possible effects of a 
government intervention in healthcare on the health of a country, an important one is the 
level of industrialization of the country. A question that should be further explored is: if 
industrialized countries tend to have better health because of their high. per capita GDPs, 
does that mean that GDP is more important, or does the high health for those countries 
with high GDPs and low levels of government involvement cause the data to be skewed? 
4.3 Conclusion 
Unfortunately the econometric study reported in this chapter has not provided the 
results a progressive economist would have hoped for. The only conclusion that can be 
safely drawn is that GDP per capita and education clearly explain health outcomes. 
Nothing however can be said about the role of government participation in the health care 
system (that is, some form of public option) on health outcomes. Yet, this econometric 
analysis is only one first step in the vast range of specifications and data that could be 
used to dig deeper in the analysis of my hypothesis. This may sound like an excuse, a 
non-scientific way to accept results. But it is also true that this econometric model was 
construed and analyzed with severe time constraints, and that much more explanatory 













































techniques, a richer set of observations, and so on. While it is easy to accept that income 
per capita and education support the general health of a country, it remains implausible to 
me that the lack of health insurance for a large percentage of the population does not 
reveal fundamental explanatory power on health outcomes. Lots of work for further 
studies! 
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This research project began in the summer of2009, a time in which Washington 
became entrenched in levels of dialogue and political conflict on healthcare reform never 
seen before. Most politicians seemed to endorse some variety ofhealthcare reform 
proposal in the lobbied competition to climb the steps of Capitol Hill. The thesis 
reviewed the two main proposals finally endorsed by the House and the Senate during fall 
2009, together with the health care systems already in place in two countries 
economically and culturally comparable to the United States: Germany and the United 
Kingdom. A comparative evaluation of the German and British systems, the existing 
American model, and the proposals discussed in Congress, clearly told two very different 
stories of the evolution ofhealthcare across the Atlantic: while our European cousins 
began their healthcare system with a public model then later added private insurance 
companies, the United States developed a private market for health insurance, and is now 
debating whether to add a public option. 
The public option was an element of the House's proposal, but on March 21,2010 
the House voted to endorse the Senate plan, which does not contain the provision that 
would have introduced the government as an active participant in the healthcare market. 
But on March 21, 20 I 0 the United States took a masterful legislative step, and since then 
the healthcare system of the United States has changed. The number of uninsured 
individuals will greatly diminish in the course of the next few years, and insurance 
companies will encounter greater bargaining power in their clients because of the 
introduction of state-by-state insurance exchanges. The plan passed by the House, now 
law, was born from the Senate proposal reviewed in the second chapter of this essay . 
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Main variations introduced on the original Senate proposal by the House consist in 
maintaining sons and daughters' coverage in the parents' plan until they reach the 26th 
year of age, and increasing the funding burden on families with incomes in the highest 
tax bracket. But there is not be a public option, and not all Americans will have coverage. 
Most will. 
The thesis concludes with an econometric analysis according to which only 
income per capita and education have significant explanatory power on health outcomes, 
defined in terms of the World Health Organization's health index, life expectancy at 
birth, and mortality rate. The analysis unfortunately does not show that an increase in 
government involvement in health care spending has a significant effect on the overall 
health of a country. This would seem to be a statement that puts the fundamental 
question of this essay to rest. Yet, not only the econometric analysis shows that while the 
overall effect of government involvement in health care is not significant, there is a 
positive relationship between health spending by governments and health outcomes; but 
also the question asked is characterized by such degree of complexity to be hardly 
disposed by one econometric attempt or specific result. Do these results prove that the 
addition of a public health insurance option would not still improve quality or 
affordability of health care? The first chapter offers a comprehensive explanation of why 
there should be intervention in the market due to failures of the market to operate at its 
most efficient and beneficial level. The econometrics analysis performed in the fourth 
chapter has some utility, especially to delineate further empirical work needed, but so do 












































(only public) health care models suggested by medical doctors to strategies to avoid 
adverse selection by insurance companies. 
With all of this said, I cannot see how the United States can achieve its goal of 
making health care affordable to everyone without the addition of a public health 
insurance option. Universality is a public rather than private concept; it is a concept that 
emanates from the Constitution rather than the statutes of private companies. While the 
econometric analysis shows that health outcomes may not be improved by a public health 
system, scholarly contributions reviewed in the third chapter and the effective and 
successful examples of public health care systems reviewed in the first chapter of this 
thesis make a strong case that the best way to accomplish the goal may still be to add a 
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